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Despite significant advances, there is
more work to be done before the interna-
tional community can be confident that it
possesses sufficient protection against any
future smallpox threats. The current
World Health Organization (WHO)-
approved research agenda for smallpox
has been tightly focused by the interpre-
tation that research ‘‘essential for public
health’’ equates solely to applied research
related directly to the development of new
antiviral drugs, safer vaccines, and better
diagnostics. Despite considerable advances
in this direction, we argue that the
research agenda with live variola virus is
not yet finished and that significant gaps
still remain.
Variola virus is unique amongst the
orthopoxviruses in that it is known to be a
sole human pathogen. The viral and host
factors responsible for this human-specific
tropism remain essentially unknown to this
day, although the current genomic infor-
mation across orthopoxviruses makes hy-
pothesis-driven experimental design using
functional genomic approaches more fea-
sible. Indeed, greater exploitation of cur-
rent technologies may lead to additional
therapeutic or diagnostic products to
better respond to any future emergency
situation resulting from a smallpox
appearance.
Smallpox disease was declared eradicat-
ed in 1980, and today is the only human
disease to be eliminated by WHO. Shortly
after WHO officially declared smallpox
eradicated, a decision was made to
ultimately destroy the remaining stocks of
live variola virus, with interim use of the
virus permitted only for defined WHO-
approved research projects. Variola virus
stocks were then voluntarily consolidated
in the early 1980s to two WHO Collab-
orating Center laboratories, one in Russia
and the other in the United States, which
remain the only two WHO-approved sites
for research with live variola virus.
In 1999, following an independent
report on variola research by the Institute
of Medicine (IOM), a decision by WHO
was made to increase the amount of
research that utilized live variola virus.
The WHO Advisory Committee on Vari-
ola Virus Research (ACVVR) was subse-
quently formed to oversee the research,
and research began to generate additional
virus genomic information, characterize
new antivirals and therapeutics, evaluate
newer generations of vaccines and biolog-
ics, develop diagnostics, better define
disease pathogenesis, and generate animal
models of smallpox disease. This work was
further refined by the World Health
Assembly (WHA) to focus on ‘‘essential
public health research’’ in 2005 and was
subsequently comprehensively reviewed
by the IOM in 2009 [1], and the WHO
ACVVR and its assembled external advi-
sory group (called AGIES) in 2010 and
2013. Each of the last two comprehensive
reviews was prepared to summarize re-
search advances and to recommend
whether additional research with live virus
would be required in order to fulfill the
original WHO-mandated agenda, in ad-
vance of a WHA-wide discussion about
the fate of the remaining variola virus
materials stored at the two WHO Collab-






pdf). Because of the advances made in the
acquisition of knowledge to support diag-
nostics, antiviral, and vaccine research and
development through to the regulatory
review process, the majority opinions of
those in these groups are now, in 2014,
more supportive of discontinuing the use
of live variola virus for future research
studies.
Significant advances in our abilities to
diagnose, treat, and to prevent smallpox
disease have been made in the past two
decades, largely as a function of concerted
efforts using surrogate orthopoxviruses,
and work with live variola virus that has,
up to now, been accepted as needed under
the ACVVR framework. Diagnostic ad-
vances have been used to rule out
suspected cases of smallpox [2] and to
diagnose other related orthopoxvirus dis-
eases, such as the cases of human mon-
keypox in the United States in 2003 [3],
and enhancements of surveillance for
monkeypox in the Democratic Republic
of Congo [4]. As a result, improved
recognition of smallpox-like diseases has
been greatly augmented. Increased recog-
nition and characterization of enzootic
human infections with vaccinia [5] and
cowpox [6] have, respectively, also been
made in South America and Eurasia [7].
Rapid and specific nucleic acid–based tests
for more accurate diagnosis of smallpox,
as well as other orthopoxvirus-related
diseases, have been published in the
peer-reviewed literature. A real-time
PCR-based assay system has received
regulatory approval in Russia, and an
orthopoxvirus (non-variola) test has met
regulatory review standards for use in the
Laboratory Response Network (LRN) in
the US [2]. Work continues to develop
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protein-based diagnostic assays, which can
allow more rapid ‘‘alerts’’ to any cases of
possible smallpox disease. Because the
latter assays are often done simply, similar
to a urine pregnancy test, these could be
critical to target attention to any potential
areas of high-risk disease. However, more
efforts to finalize a dependable and
reproducible product for clinical use are
not yet completed, and key validation tests
still need to be conducted.
Several new antiviral drug candidates
have now been developed and shown to
have benefit in the treatment of orthopox-
virus disease, including variola infection of
nonhuman primates [8]. Two antivirals
with different mechanisms of action are
now in advanced stages of development as
potential smallpox drugs. ST-246, also
known as Tecovirimat or Arestyvir, is a
virion egress inhibitor with specificity for
orthopoxviruses [9], and CMX001, also
called Brincidofovir, is a DNA polymerase
inhibitor active against multiple DNA
viruses and derivative of a licensed antivi-
ral drug called cidofovir [10]; both are
orally bioavailable. The former is now
stockpiled in the US strategic national
stockpile after advanced development, but
is not yet licensed by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA); its use for treat-
ment of orthopoxvirus infections, includ-
ing smallpox, is regulated via an investi-
gational new drug (IND) process operated
by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), and hopefully will be
transitioned to a more streamlined emer-
gency use authorization (EUA) process.
Limited studies with ST-246 have been
performed to show protection against
death and decreased viral shedding when
variola is the challenge virus in nonhuman
primates [11]. Off-label use of cidofovir
and investigational use of Brincidofovir
and Arestyvir, in addition to vaccinia
immune globulin (VIG), have been suc-
cessfully used in treatment of a severe case
of eczema vaccinatum and of progressive
vaccinia in humans [12,13]. Continued
investigation to identify additional candi-
date antismallpox drugs, for example, to
screen currently approved kinase inhibi-
tors, may provide additional antiortho-
poxvirus and antismallpox therapeutics.
The original vaccines used successfully
to eradicate smallpox in the 1960s and 70s
are now in limited supply and, further-
more, were associated with what we now
consider to be an unacceptably high rate
of adverse events, some severe [14]. In
their stead, cell culture–derived smallpox
vaccines have been developed, some
derived from clonal derivatives of the
historic vaccine strains [15]. Additionally,
less reactogenic smallpox vaccines, such as
IMVAMUNE and Lc16m8 [16,17,18,19],
are now in advanced development. IM-
VAMUNE recently met the European
Medicines Agency (EMA) standards for
use for prevention of smallpox, and
Lc16m8 has been licensed for use in
Japan. Live variola virus has been used
as a target for neutralization assays by
vaccinee sera [20], as a surrogate to
understand how the immune response
elicited by these vaccines compares with
the historic vaccines or the newer versions
of vaccines directly derived from the
historic vaccines. As orthopoxvirus infec-
tions are reemerging, particularly mon-
keypox and cowpox [3,5,6,21], these
vaccines are tools not just to be used for
a smallpox response but that can also be
used for orthopoxvirus disease prevention
in general.
Despite these advances, we argue that
there is more to be done. While certain
aspects of the original research goals using
live virus have been met, other key items,
like the wider approval of accurate diag-
nostics that can distinguish smallpox from
other orthopoxvirus diseases or the full
licensure of new antiviral drugs and
vaccines that are effective against variola
virus, have not yet been completed.
Even in the past ten years, molecular
technologies have advanced considerably.
The continued use of variola virus (or its
genomic material) may be needed to
evaluate how well newer generations of
diagnostics, for instance, will perform in
the newer diagnostic platforms. Current
generations of DNA sequencing technolo-
gies are now far advanced compared to
those of 1999 and may soon supplant
PCR-based diagnostics in some advanced
laboratories. But these laboratories will not
be able to handle all smallpox diagnostic
capacity in a timely fashion; the reliance
on many international microbiology labo-
ratories will be necessary in the event of
any reemergence of smallpox in the future,
and protein-based diagnostic assays will
augment laboratory-based surveillance
and detection strategies. Although two
antiviral drugs with different mechanisms
of action are in advanced stages of
development, resistance to each of these
drugs has been elicited in cultured cells
and against one of these drugs in a
vaccinia-infected human [9,13,22,23].
Similarly, the demonstration more than a
decade ago of a recombinant ectromelia
(mousepox) virus construct that expresses
IL-4 and is more resistant to the smallpox
vaccine [24] has raised concerns of the
potential creation of a vaccine-resistant
smallpox virus. While the likelihood of the
emergence of, or creation of, either drug-
or vaccine-resistant versions of smallpox is
unknown, continued investigation to iden-
tify additional countermeasures, for exam-
ple, through screening using functional
genomics or proteomics approaches, can
further enhance our state of preparedness.
Additional studies evaluating the safety
and efficacy of drug combination therapies
will also be needed. Certainly the current
capabilities of synthetic biology and the
availability of multiple variola virus ge-
nome sequences in the published literature
make these scenarios more worrisome in
the 21st century and also make the
feasibility of ultimate final destruction of
variola virus, itself, problematic [25].
Despite this changing landscape, the
WHO-approved research agenda has
largely become conscribed to the needs
of finalizing the work on the remaining
antiviral product issues. Fundamental
research has been greatly limited over
the past decade. Thus, basic variola virus
research projects that could potentially
lead to other advances in public health
efforts have become increasingly absent
from the list of WHO-approved projects.
It should be noted that the international
scientific community has fully complied
with these WHO strictures for conducting
work with live variola virus. Also, input
from various external bodies, such as the
Institute of Medicine, has been received
and considered by the WHO in order to
develop a coherent research agenda for
live variola virus. Unique amongst ortho-
poxviruses, which are largely zoonotic
pathogens, variola is known to be a sole
human pathogen. The viral and host
factors responsible for this specific tropism
remain essentially unknown, although the
current genomic information database
across orthopoxviruses makes hypothesis-
driven experimental design using function-
al genomic approaches more feasible than
in the past. We recognize that ultimate
proof of such hypotheses will be challeng-
ing, as current animal models using variola
virus do not faithfully recapitulate the
human clinical disease process or immune
responses [26], and recombinant genetic
modification approaches are not con-
doned in use of variola. We recommend
that the scientific and world community
re-engage to discuss future research po-
tential with live variola virus to improve
disease interventions by advancing our
understanding of the virus and its rela-
tionship with its human host.
In May 2014, the WHA will consider
whether to destroy the remaining stocks of
live variola virus or, instead, to recom-
mend continued research with live variola
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virus in the two WHO-certified sites. This
research remains vital, and we believe that
the original goals of the WHO agenda for
newer and safer vaccines, fully licensed
antiviral drugs, and better diagnostics have
still not been fully met.
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